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With the growth of the number of patent applications and grant，China is also 
facing the problem of patent quality as well as patent grant delay，If not properly 
resolved， would seriously affect the incentive effect of the patent system for 
technological innovation． At present，the way of solving these problems by theorists 
and practitioners was mostly to improve the efficiency of patent examination process 
by increasing investment in human resources and hardware patent prosecution unit，
but  they ignored the role which patent application and patent invalidation 
procedures can play in patent quality controlling，as well as the economic rationality 
of each participants ， making those reforms did not achieve the desired 
effect． Therefore，this paper attempted to analyze the economic motives of patent 
applicants，patent examiners，and patent challenger，through the perspective of 
profit-driven，and to build policy system of patent quality control on this basis． 
First, this report summarizes the connotation and development of governance 
theory, and reviews the application of  governance theory in China, and points out 
that the research and reform are mainly confined to the macroeconomic areas such as 
market economy system, education and health care reform, and are directly related to 
social stability. It is pointed out that through the attempt to solve the problem of 
patent quality, we can provide a way of thinking and paradigm for the development of 
governance and social welfare through the interest-driven approach. 
Second，this report analyzed the general rule of patent policy evolution through 
dynamic perspective ， and the nature of the system applying the theory of 
entropy． On those basis，the paper made an objective evaluation of the patent policy 
which China have implemented． Then，the paper made an interpretation of the policy 
mechanism of“profit-driven”． 
Third，this report analyzed the repulsion effect from low quality patents to high 
quality patents，based on the theoretical basis of lemons market effects，specifically 
analyzes how do the low quality patents expel the high quality patents out of the 
















application and examination，the settlement of patent invalidation，as well as patent 
licensing and trading． Finally this paper makes policy recommendations solving the 
above problems． 
Fourth，this report analyzed the economic motivations of patent applicants from 
the aspects of patent speculation, establishes the theoretical model to analyze the 
reasons why the existing patent speculative means can not work, and the way to 
realize the "target effect" of the patent fee. 
Fifth，this report  studied  the issue of patent expansion from the view patent 
attorneys，this report studied the economic motivation behind the behavior of patent 
speculation and patent expansion． In the first part，the paper analyzed how did 
speculative patent application make R&D application out of market，with the help of 
theory of “Market for Lemons”，and studied the limitations of the policy tools，such as 
application fee and statutory creative standard． In the second part，this paper studied 
the role which the principle of estoppels and the interpretation of patent claims can 
play in inhibiting patent expansion． 
Sixth，the paper analyzed how to adjust the efforts of patent examiner invested in 
improving speed or assuring quality，from the perspective of the inside of patent 
office． The paper found that there were soils for principal-agent problem in the 
patent office ， through the analysis of target heterogeneity and asymmetric 
information． The paper also build the rational planning model of patent examiners to 
study the effect of the remuneration and appraisal system in the patent offices of 
European and US on the behavior of patent examiner，and the positive effect of 
introducing a “quality performance bonuses”． Based on the theoretical model， the 
paper also summarized the problem of our existing patent examination management 
system and proposed solutions for improvement． 
Finally，the paper studied the economic motivation of the alleged infringer in the 
game with the patentee，based on the reality that the patent challenger is always the 
alleged infringer in patent infringement lawsuit． The paper analyze in detail the 
direct factors such as，prior art defense，reconciliation，funding difference，the indirect 
















information asymmetry and quality of patent examination，which affect the efficiency 
of patent invalidation． At last，the paper gave advice about how to improve the 
quality control effect of patent invalidation． 
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题（Graf，2007）。③Allison and Hunter 从专利法律效力的角度提出，专利质量
是指获得授权的专利相对于现有技术而言具备明显的进步，并且能够稳定地抵抗
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Scotchmer and Green 认为专利虽然具有技术、法律与经济的多重属性，但是决定
专利质量的根本因素在于技术——发明的新颖性和非显而易见性程度越高、技术
越先进，其法律效力才会越稳定，经济价值也才会越高（Scotchmer and Green，
1990）。①Abraham and Moitra 提出专利质量应当是发明创造技术方案自身的进










利的经济质量。如 Hall and Harhoff  认为，专利具有价值是由于其包含如果不具
备专利保护企业就不敢将其商业化的技术方案（Hall and Harhoff，2004）。⑥ 
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